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THE HASTINGS, LAW JOURNAL
THY WILL BE DONE: THE STATUS OF CHARITABLE
BEQUESTS IN CALIFORNIA
The effect, wisdom and validity of the California mortmain statute' can best
be evaluated wheii considered in light of general testamentary power and tradi-
tional restrictions on the right of charities to hold land. Both of these c6nsidera-
tions, as affected by the changing social, political and economic order, comprise
the background for limitations on "the testators power to bequeath to charities.
Similar mortmam acts are now found'm eleven American junsdictions, 2 and only
recently were repealed in England.3
The Common Law preference for free alienation of land received a significant
impetus with -passage of the Statute of Wills.4 The extent to which the testator
should be allowed freedom of alienation thus became somewhat more than an
academic question. The arguments in favor of full' testamentary freedom have
been summarized as follows: there is a natural right to dispose of property as
one chooses; there would be less incentive to work and accumulate if there were
no freedom of testamentary disposition; members of g testator's family should not
be protected agamst disinheritance, as they may be undeserving; the elderly' may
be in a better position to -secure attention if. their families are not guaranteed be-
quests; and further restrictions on personal freedom should be avoided.5 The
merit of these contentions has been refuted by legislatures which have imposed
some restnctions 6 on the testators power of disposition. The question hereto
considered is whether or not legislation restricting testamentary power, favoring
the right of heirs to take and placing restrictions on the right of charities to
inherit, is still justifiable.
The History of Mortmain
An important factor which must be considered- with respect to the present
restrictions on charitable bequests is the legal status of charities. Traditionally,
charitie have been favored-by the law. They are not bound by the rule against
perpetuities' ¢ nor the rule against a ccumulations; 8 many qualify for tax exempt
I CAL. PnoB. CODE §§ 41-43. "Mortmain" is used here only as a term of convenience;
it has no ramifications- as to the policy of the statute. See note 37 infra and accompany-
ing text.2 See, CAL. P1ROB. CODE §§ 41-43; .D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-202 (1961); FA. STAT.
§ 731.19 (1965); GA. CODE ANN.§.113-107 (1935); InArO CODE Am. 14-326 (1948);
IOwA CODE § 633.266 (1964); Miss. CODE ANN. §. 671 (,1942); MoNT. Ev. CoDEs ANN.
§ 91-142 (1947); N.Y. DECEm. EsT. § 17 (McKinney, 1949); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. §
2107.06 (Page, 1954); PA. STAT. tit. 20, 180.7 (1936).
3 Charities Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 58.
4 Sn4vs, Ft-runn ITERx-sTs 11 (1966).
5 Haskell, Power of Disinheritance: Proposal for Reform, 52 GEo. L.J. 499, 501
(1963).
6 For a discussion of the statutory protection for the spouse in marital property,
see Phipps, Marital Property Interests, 27 Rocx Mr. L. REv. 180 (1955).
7 E.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. XX, § 9, Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641, 648, 266 Pac.
526, 528 (1928); Estate of Sutro, 155 Cal. 727, 734, 102 Pac. 920, 922 (1909); People
v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 137-39, 45 Pac. 270, 271 (1896).
8 E.g., Estate of McKenzie, 227 Cal. App. 2d 167, 172, 38 Cal. Rptr. 496, 500
(1964); Collins v. Lyon, Inc., 181 Va. 230, 24 S.E.2d 572 (1943).
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status,0 and courts will attempt to put gifts to charities in force.'0 In addition, the
English cha'ncery courts openly favored charities," as did Parliament.' 2 The logical
reasons for this favoritism were the natural predilection for an agency dedicated
to the doing of good works, and an appreciation for the corresponding reduction
of claims on the public purse.' 8
However, the protection of charitable interests was not uniformly advocated.
There were two powerful forces in feudal England, the Crown and the nobility,
that disliked seeing real property pass into the control of charities. Since charitable
corporations do not die, the lord of the fee was prevented from collecting Ins cus-
tomary feudal dues on succession and thus feudal revenues were in danger of
extinction. 14 Extensive landholdings came under the control of the church as dying
testators attempted to gain spiritual salvation at the expense of their waiting
heirs.' 3 The increasing percentage of land owned by the ecclesiastical corporations
prompted the mortmain statutes, which were the "effort of the civil power to curb
the influence of the spiritual power, -and check a dangerous tendency to ennch
corporations of a religious or eleemosynary character."' 6
One of the first legislative enactments against charitable alienations in England
was the Magna Charta,17 which prohibited gifts of land to religious houses and
voided any attempts to so convey by allowing the lord of the fee to reenter. This
was followed by a history of legislation closing loopholes found by lawyers at-
tempting to avoid the effect of the statute.' 8 The early history of English mort-
main was culminated during the reign of Henry VIII, who effectively curbed
the mounting wealth and power of the ecclesiastical corporations by confiscating
9 INT. 1Ev. CoDE of 1954, § 170 (income tax), § 2055 (estate tax), § 2522 (gift tax).
10 See Estate of Thomasson, 245 A.C.A. 844, 852, 54 Cal. Rptr. 229, 233 (1966);
S mEs, The Dead Hand Achieves Immortality: .Gifts to Charity, in PuIuc Poricy AND
Ti DE-A HAND 110 (1955).
"1 E.g., Sonley v. Cloclanaker's Co., 1 Bro. CC. 81, 28 Eng. Rep. 998 (1780).
12 E.g., Erection of Hospitals Act. 1597, 39 Eliz. 1, c. 5, § 1 (allowed the establish-
ment of charitable corporations for hospitals, churches, poorhouses and houses of cor-
rection); Construction of Churches Act, 1803, 43 Geo. 3, c. 108 (allowed gifts of'land
to churches); Greenwich Hospital Act, 1829, 10 Geo. 4, c. 25 (allowed trustees of
Greenwich Hospital to hold land without a Crown license); School Sites Act, 1844, 7 &
8 Vict. c. 37 (allowed deeds of land without valuable consideration to establish schools
for the poor).
Is Bristowe, Legal Restrictions on Gifts to Charity, 7 L.Q. R-Ev. 262, 266 (1891).
14Joslin, "Mortmatn" in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Study, 29
CAN. B. REv. 621 (1951).
15 PtnozAT, TisE Cmuosrrms AND LAw OF Wanis 131 (1876).
'Old. at 132.
179 Hen. 3, c. 36 (1225), reenacted as, 25 Edw. 1, c. 36 (1297).
18 See, e.g., A Statute of Mortmamn, 1279, 7 Edw. 1, st. 2 (allowed entry by the
lord of the fee on alienation of any lands in mortmam); Statute de Donis Conditionalibus,
1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 32 (circumscribed the right of the church to use common recovery);
Statute of Qua Emptores, 1290, 18 Edw. 1, c. 1 (provided that no sales of lands or
tenements into mortmain would be permitted); Mortmain Act, 1391, 15 Rich. 2, c. 5
(practice of converting lands lying near churches for grave purposes by papal bulls with-
out Crown license was prohibited); Assurances to Charitable Uses Act, 1531, 23 Hen. 8,
c. 10 (prohibited all assurances and trusts of land to the use of parish churches, guilds,
and fraternities if over twenty years duration).
NOTES
their holdings.' 9 Elizabeth I ameliorated the restraints on charitable gifts because
the prohibition of religious charities had significantly reduced the amount of non-
state support available for worthy causes, and it was thought wise to encourage
private charitable activities. 20 Encouraged by this policy, testators could and
did make large provisions for non-superstitious charities. 21 As large acreages con-
tinued to pass into the control of the so-called "dead hands"22 of charity, it be-
came obvious that the reasons for initially passing the mortmain act were not
being met.2 3 In order to retard the shift of land ownership to charitable corpora-
tions, further legislation was passed in 1736, precluding the gift or conveyance
of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, or momes to be expended in the pur-
chase of such "to or upon any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, or
otherwise in trust or for the benefit of any charitable use whatsoever "24
Subsequently, the English statute was reenacted by the Mortmain and Charitable
Uses Act of 188825 prohibiting the conveyance of real property to or for the use
of a charity unless a license in mortmain was received from the Crown.28 This
act otherwise continued the main provisions of the Georgian Mortmain statute.27
At the adoption of the 1888 act, three reasons were given in favor of restricting
charitable bequests, namely, to prevent disinheritance, to prevent death bed
charity, and to prevent tie ups of land.28 It is evident, however, that these reasons
did not ]ustify the statute. The Common Law had no particular concern with
39 Monastery Confiscation Act, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, c. 28 (confiscated church posses-
sioY&" for the King, his heirs and. assigos); Dissolution of Monasteries and Abbies Act,
1539, 31 Hen. 8, c. 13 (extended confiscation policy and insured that such properties
would go to the King); St. John of Jerusalem Act, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 24 (confiscated
Church hospital m Palestine).
2035 Eliz. 1, c. 7, § 27 (1593) (allowed any person, for a twenty year period, to
convey land m fee sinple to houses of correction and abiding houses); Erection of
Hospitals Act, 1597, 39 Eliz. 1, c. 5, § 1 (allowed the establishment of charitable cor-
porations for hospitals, churches, poorhouses and houses of correction).
219 Ceo. 2, c. 36 (1736) (preamble).
22 The derivation of the term has been explained in various ways. One explanation
was that the land no longer yielded services to the feudal lord, such as wardships, reliefs,
etc., and that the lands were thus like "dead hands" to the lord because they gave him
no service. CoxE, Lrrr.rro N 2, b. (Coventry ed. 1830). Blackstone attributed the term's
derivation to the fact that the clergy were regarded as dead men by the law, so the
land held by them was in effect held by dead hands. 1 BL&cKs ro , CommuzrrAmms 479
(10th ed. 1787).
23 LovE_.Lss, WuaLs 257 (12th ed. 1839).
24 9 Geo. 2, c. 36. An exception was allowed m the case of gifts made by deed,
indented, sealed and delivered m the presence of two witnesses at least one year before
the death of the donor.
2551 & 52 Vict. c. 42 (amended by 55 & 56 Viet. c. 11 (1892).
2 6 Alienation of land m mortmain was allowable when a license m mortmain was
received by the charity from- the Crown. The key statutes governing the licensing prior
to 1888 were: Ordinatio de Libertatibus perquirendis, 1299, 27 Edw. 1, stat. 2; A
Statute of Amortismg Lands, 1306, 34 Edw. 1, stat. 3; Encouragement of Charitable
Gifts Act, 1696, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 37.
279 Geo. 2, c. 36 (1736).
28 Bnstowe, supra note 13, at 268.
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preventing dismheritance, 29 nor did it prevent disposition of personality to
charity. 0 Death bed charity was not necessarily less worthy than other charity,31
and the benefit accruing to the public from a charitable gift was greater than
that accruing from the same property in private ownership.32 The history of
mortinam is long, and the reasons given to justify the policy have vaned at differ-
ent penods in history. The modem statutes must be viewed against this historical
background since they continue the pattern of discrimination against the charities'
right to inherit.
The purpose of the statutes is the protection of the testator's family against
disinheritance. The American statutes usually have three common provisions-
percentage restrictions,33 a protected class34 and a time period within which gifts
are controlled.33 The first two of these show the shift in purpose from protection
of the Crown and nobility to protection of the interests of the heirs. Percentage
restrictions on the amount of the charitable gift allow both the heirs and the
charity to share in the estate of the testator. Furthermore, limiting the effect of
the statute to a protected class allows the charity to take except when members
of such a class survive. The time periods are based on the theory that the will
may be less rational when the testator makes it with fear of impending death;
he may not reasonably consider the objects of his natural bounty.3 6 These statutes
are not "mortmai" in the strict sense of the term in that they are not hostile
to the charity's power to take,37 but they are an additional limitation on testa-
mentary power. They are intended to "protect private rights, or more accurately
stated, private expectancies"38 on the part of the testator's family. The policy
behind the legislation affecting testamentary capacity was influenced by the
29 The abolishment of the "Custom of London" in 1724 ended the only protection
for the spouse (except for dowry and curtesy) and children-the doctrine of reasonable
parts. For a discussion of the history of disinheritance, see Calm, Restraints on Disn-
heritance, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 139 (1936). See In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 288, 49 Pac. 192
(1897) for a case expressing the contemporary California position.
30 It may be surmised that by 1888 in England a substantial part of the nation's
wealth was in personalty, rather than real property. See THE Wouz ALMANAC 102
(Chicago World, 1888).31 Bnstowe, supra note 13, at 269.
32 S ms, The Dead Hand Achteves Immortality: Gifts to Charity, in Ptuauc Pomcy
AND m. DEAD HAxs 116 (1955). In addition, feudal tenures had been abolished. The
only feudal incident remaining by this time was escheat. Obviously, the object of mort-
main could no longer be to secure feudal tenures.
33 E.g., CAL. PnoB. CODE § 41; N.Y. DECED. EsT. § 17 (McKinney, 1949).
34 E.g., CAL. Pnon. CODE §§ 41 & 43; N.Y. DEcED. EsT. § 17 (McKinney, 1949).
35Ibid. For an excellent discussion of the current American statutes, see Fisch,
Restrictions on Charitable Giving, 10 N.Y.L.F 307 (1964).
36 "The reason for the time periods is that a testamentary gift given in a will made
a considerable time prior to the testators death, at a time when he is not motivated by
a death bed fear of hell and the need of purchasing heavenly bliss, is not as likely to
be improvident as a charitable gift influenced by the fear of death, purgatory and the
npending judgment." 1 PAGE, WinS § 3.16, at 108 (2d ed. 1952).
37 E.g., Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 680, 687, 115 Pac. 242, 245 (1911); Estate of
Guitierrez, 220 Cal. App. 2d 6, 33 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1963). See In re Webster's Estate,
178 Misc. 342, 33 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1942).
38 1 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 36, § 3.15, at 105.
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opimon.that a man near death is not as able to rationally make a choice between
Ins family, who are the objects of his natural bounty, and charity, as he may be
in less extreme times.39 All of the modem statutes seem to be predicated on this
opimon. 40
The California Legislation Restricting Charitable Bequests
The present California statute, Probate Code sections 41-43, voiding gifts to
charity unless the will was executed prior to thirty days before death, originated
in 1874.41 Permissible gifts -are limited to one-third of the estate if the testator
leaves heirs within the protected class, even though the will may have been
executed prior to the insulating time period. Both specific and residuary bequests
39 Id. § 3.16, at 108.
4o Fisch, supra note 35.
41 AcTs, Amm-AToRy or Tim CoD, ch. 304, p. 275 (1874), reenacted by CAL.
STATS. 1931, c. 281, p. 589, §§ 41-43, without substantial change. See note 50 tnfra,
for text of § 41 as then enacted. The present code sections are as follows:
§ 41. No estate, real or personal, may be bequeathed or devised to any charit-
able or benevolent society or corporation, or to any person or persons in trust
for charitable uses, by a testator who leaves a spouse, brother, sister, nephew,
niece, descendant or ancestor surviving him, who, under the will, or the laws
of succession, would otherwise have taken the property as bequeathed or
devised, unless the will was duly executed at least 30 days before death, such
devises and legacies shall be valid, but they may not collectively exceed one-
third of the testator's estate as against his spouse, brother, sister, nephew,
niece, descendant or ancestor, who would otherwise, as aforesaid, have taken
the excess over one-third, and if they do, a pro rata deduction from such
devises and legacies shall be made so as to reduce the aggregate thereof to
one-third of the estate. All property bequeathed or devised contrary to the
provisions of this section shall go to the spouse, brother, sister, nephew, niece,
descendant or ancestor of the testator, if and to the extent that they would have
taken said property as aforesaid but for such devises or legacies, otherwise the
testator's estate shall go in accordance with his will and such devises and
legacies shall be unaffected.
Nothing herein contained is intended to, or shall be deemed or construed
to vest any property devised or bequeathed to charity or in trust for a charit-
able use, in any person who is not a relative of the testator belonging to one
of the classes mentioned herein, or in any such relative, unless and then only
to the extent that such relative takes the same under a substitutional or
residuary bequest or devise in the will or under the laws of succession because
of the absence of other effective disposition in the will.
§ 42: Bequests and devises to or for the use or benefit of the State, or any
mumcipality, county or political subdivision within the State, or any institu-
tion belonging to the State, or belonging to any municipality, county or political
subdivision within the State, or to any educational institution which is exempt
from taxation under section la of Article XII or section 10 of Article IX
of the Constitution of this State and statutes enacted thereunder, or for the
use or benefit of any such educational institution, or made by a testator leaving
no spouse, brother, sister, nephew, niece, descendant or ancestor surviving by
whom the property so bequeathed or devised would have been taken if said
property had not been so bequeathed or devised, are excepted from the
restrictions of this article.
§ 43: Nothing in this article contained shall apply to bequests or devises made
by will executed at least six months prior to the death of a testator who leaves
no spouse, child, grandchild or parent, or when all of such heirs, by a writing
executed at least six months prior to his death, shall have waived the restriction.
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are under the purmew of the statute. 42 In general, specific bequests will be effec-
tuated before provision is made. for residuary bequests, 48 and when both are
present'im the will, only the excess above the specific bequest to "the naxmum
permissible one-third of the estate will pass to the residuary legatee.41 The statute
does not limit gifts to individuals for charitable purposes, but only gifts to charit-
able corporations, societies, or gifts in trust for charitable uses.45 It does not void
gifts but only requires that they be reduced to legal limits.46 It applies to foreign
wills of testators who have either real47 or personal property48 in the state.
The present statute is the sam6 as the provision enacted in 1874 with the
exception of two amendments subsequently prompted by cases. In Estate of
Garthwaite,49 testatrix died without legal heirs and with a will executed witbin
the prohibited period. The court ruled that under the statute as it then stood 0
the gift was void, and so escheated to the state. This obviously unjust result was
remedied by the elimination of the general term "legal heirs" and the substitu-
tion of a limited protected class of heirs,51 and by the further provision that, in
the absence of a member of the protected class, the estate would pass as provided
by the will.5 2 This amendment has relaxed limits on charitable bequests by narrow-
ing the class of persons who could challenge.5r
The case commonly credited with inducing the legislature to add the last
paragraph to section 41 is Estate of Broad.64 There, testator executed a will within
thirty days of death. He devised his estate to charity with a residuary clause in
favor of twelve legatees, none of whom were relatives, and ignored his meces
and nephews. The court construed the statutes to mean that if the testator were
survived by any heirs within the protected class, then the bequest to charity
would fail. Justice [now Cluef Justice] Traynor's dissent attacked the decision
stating that the bequest to charity should fail only if there were surviving heirs
42 Estate of Hamilton, 181 Cal. 758, 186 Pac. 587 (1919).
43 Id. at 762, 186 Pac. at 588.
44 Ibid.
45 Id. at 772, 186 Pac. at 592; accord, Estate 'of Stemman, 35 Cal. App. 2d 95, 94
P.2d 821 (1939).
46 Estate of Hamilton, supra note 42.
47Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 680, 115 Pac. 242 (1911).
48 Estate of Layton, 217 Cal. 451, 19 P.2d 793 (1933); Estate of Sloane, 171 Cal.
248, 152 Pac. 540 (1915).
49 131 Cal. App. 321, 21 P.2d '465 (1933).50 
"No estate, real -or personal, may be bequeathed or devised to any charitable
or benevolent' society or corporation, or to any person or persons in trust for charitable
uses, except the same be done by will executed at least thirty days before the death
of the testator. If so made at least thirty days before death, such devises and legacies
shall be valid, but they may not collectively exceed one-third of the estate of a testator
who has legal heirs, and if they do, a pro rata deduction from such devises and legacies
shall be made so as to reduce the aggregate thereof to one-third of the estate. All dis-
positions of property made contrary hereto shall be void, and go to the residuary
legatees or devisees or heirs, according to law." Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 281, p. 589, , 41.
51 CAL. PROB. CODE § 41.
52See Estate of Mautner, 38 Cal. App. 2d 521, 101 P.2d 520 (1940) in which an
estate passed to charity.under a similar fact situation.,5a Estate of Davison, 96 Cal. App. 2d 263, 215 P.2d 504 (1950).
5420 Cal. 2d 612, 128 P.2d 1 (1942).
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of the protected class who could take under the will as residuary legatees or by
the laws of succession as heirs at law. This opinion was apparently shared by the
legislature, which then amended the statute to preclude a member of the pro-
tected class from taking unless he could take under the will or by intestate
succession.55
Construction of the Statute
In general, the courts have been forced to regard the California statute as a
limitation on "the right of the testator to dispose of Is property in accordance
with his own inclinations and desires."5 6 As such, the statute is- strictly construed
against those who are challenging the gift to charity.57 Although collateral heirs
outside of the protected class may have rights in the estates of intestates under
other sections of the Probate Code, the courts have held that only those who have
rights under sections 41-43 will be allowed to challenge bequests to charity.58
The right to challenge a will under Probate Code sections 41-43 is not the
same as a general right to contest.5 9 The basis of the general right has been held
to be an illegal deprivation of a property right which attaches to the heir on
the death of the ancestor,60 and which can be prosecuted by a later dying heir's
personal representative.6 ' In contrast to this, the right of an heir to challenge
a charitable bequest is not a property right until he asserts it,62 but is merely a
privilege given him by statute. The right to object to a charitable bequest is
personal, and the benefits which flow therefrom are personal and extend only to
those of the enumerated classes who have filed objections.5 Indications are that
the courts will refuse to allow heirs from outside the protected class to gain
benefits from a challenge by a protected heir.64 The right to challenge does not
pass to the representative of a decedent heir as part of his estate,0 5 although once
the heir has asserted the right, ins administrator has been permitted to continue
with the suit.68
55 CAL. PnOB. CODE § 41.
50 In re Plaster's Will, 266 App. Div. 439, 43 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1943), construed the
New York statute, and was quoted with approval in Estate of Bunn, 33 Cal. 2d 897,
900, 206 P.2d 635, 637 (1949).
57 Estate of Bunn, supra note 56, at 900, 206 P.2d at 637; Estate of Davison, 96
Cal. App. 2d 263, 215 P.2d 504 (1950).5 8 Estate of Jephcott, 115 Cal. App. 2d 277, 251 P.2d 1001 (1953); Estate of
Randall, 86 Cal. App. 2d 422, 194 P.2d.709 (1948). In addition, the courts have ex-
pressly stated that amendments to one section of the article enlarging the class of people
who may challenge would not also amend other sections. See Estate of Mealy, 91 Cal.
App. 2d 371, 204 P.2d 971 (1949); Estate of Cottrill, 65 Cal. App. 2d 222, 150 P.2d
214 (1944).
59 Estate of Hughes, 202 Cal. App. 2d 12, 20 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1962).
60Estate of Baker, 170 Cal. 578, 586, 150 Pac. 989, 992 (1915).
61 Id. at 587, 150 Pac. at 993.
6 Estate of Sanderson, 58 Cal. 2d 522, 25 Cal. Rptr. 69, 375 P.2d 37 (1962);
Estate of Adams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 698, 709, 331 P.2d 149, 156 (1958).
63 Estate of Guitierrez, 220 Cal. App. 2d 6, 33 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1963).
64 Tbzd.
65 Estate of Bunn, 33 Cal. 2d 897, 206 P.2d 635 (1949).
86Estate of Sanderson, 58 Cal. 2d 522, 375 P.2d 37 (1962); Estate of Guitierrez,
220 Cal. App. 2d 6, 33 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1963).
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Community property law has had its own impact on court interpretation of
the statute. Children from a former marriage of a predeceased spouse have no
standing to void the bequest even though community property from the first
marriage comprises part of the estate of the testator, and although they have
rights to intestate shares under other sections of the Probate Code. 7 An even
more complicated situation is presented when heirs of a later dying spouse chal-
lenge an estate which is comprised of community property. Since, under Probate
Code section 228, one-half of the estate falling into intestacy would return to
the family of the predeceased spouse, the challenging heirs of testator can only
take one-half of the amount over the permissible one-third to charity, with the
other half going under the will to the charity.68
The statute has presented many other problems for the court to consider.
When, for example, there are successive estates, and the non-charity life tenant
has a power to invade the corpus, it is difficult to calculate the value of the
charity's remainder interest. In such cases, the life tenant has been allowed to
surrender Ins tenancy and purchase an annuity, thus facilitating the determina-
tion of the relative values. 69 Further, courts will allow members of the protected
class to challenge and void the gift on appeal from a decree of distribution,70
provided, however, that the decree has not become final.71 The bequest cannot be
challenged after a final decree of partial distribution has been entered, even
though it may be readily apparent that the one-third limit has been exceeded.72
Codicils to the will added during the prohibited period have been held not to
invalidate the charitable bequest on challenge if they do not enlarge the amount
given to the charity or change the terms of the bequest.78 The Califorma courts
have held that the estate to which the one-third limitation applies is the gross
estate less administration costs, federal estate taxes and proved debts.74 This value
is ascertained as of the date of distribution,75 and the base estate is not ]ust that
within the ]urisdiction of the court, but the total estate wherever located.76
As might be expected of any law that limits testamentary power, many meth-
ods have been used to avoid the effect of the mortmain statutes. The emphasis
on strict construction has led to the conclusion that such statutes are only ap-
plicable to dispositions that are strictly testamentary.7 7 It has been hypothesized
67Estate of Jephcott, 115 Cal. App. 2d 277, 251 P.2d 1001 (1953).
OsEstate of Randall, 86 Cal. App. 2d 422, 194 P.2d 709 (1948).
69Estate of Nicely, 235 Cal. App. 2d 174, 44 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1965). But cf. Estate
of Hughes, 202 Cal. App. 2d 12, 20 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1962); Estate of Gorchakoff, 108
Cal. App. 2d 44, 238 P.2d 121 (1951); Estate of Campbell, 175 Cal. 345, 165 Pac. 931
(1917).
70 Estate of Moran, 122 Cal. App. 2d 167, 264 P.2d 598 (1953).
71 Estate of Adams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 698, 331 P.2d 149 (1958).
72 Estate of Lingg, 71 Cal. App. 2d 403, 162 P.2d 707 (1945).
"1 E.g., Estate of McDole, 215 Cal. 328, 10 P.2d 75 (1932); Estate of McCauley,
138 Cal. 432, 71 Pac. 512 (1903); Estate of Herbert, 131 Cal. App. 2d 666, 281 P.2d
57 (1955); Estate of Pence, 117 Cal. App. 323, 4 P.2d 202 (1931).
74Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 680, 115 Pac. 242 (1911); Estate of Moore, 219 Cal.
App. 2d 737, 33 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1963).
"tEstate of Campbell, 175 Cal. 345, 165 Pac. 931 (1917).
76Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 680, 115 Pac. 242 (1911).
77 President of Bowdon College v. Merritt, 75 Fed. 490 (N.D. Cal. 1896); Ruther-
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that the same methods used to avoid the widow's share can be used to avoid
the mortmain statutes.78 This would indicate that joint tenancy with a charity,7
the charity as beneficiary of a life insurance policy,80 and a joint bank account
arrangement with a charitys ' could all be used. Another method of circumvention
would be to have the testator create an inter vivos charitable trust reserving to
himself a power of revocation and a life interest.82 One authority has commented
that even if such trusts are executed a short time before death and include
amounts above the maximum permissible amount, they will be allowed.8 3 Death
bed deeds have been held to operate outside the statute,8 4 thereby affording
another alternative to the dying donor.
The testator can even avoid the effect of the statute within the four comers
of the will. Courts have allowed gifts to a person with a request in the will to
use the gift for charitable purposes.8 5 Although this does not create a legally
enforceable trust, the testator can choose someone who would feel an obligation
to use the bequest as requested.88 California courts, by their construction of the
mortmain statute, have allowed a simple method of circumvention. Since heirs
cannot challenge the bequest unless (and to the extent that) they can take either
under the will or by intestate succession, the possibility of a challenge can easily
be precluded by inserting clauses providing for alternative takers. outside the
protected class in -the event that the gift to charity fails.87 Such clauses for the
benefit of third parties-will prevent any of the estate from falling into mtestacy,
and so will prevent the heirs from takang by the laws of succession. If the rela-
tives cannot take, they will not be permitted to challenge and the will stands
as written.88
Thus, it can be concluded that the status of charitable bequests in Califorma
is dependent upon the interplay of three factors: the amount of the bequest, the
presence or absence of residuary or substitutional clauses for the benefit of third
parties, and the existence or non-emstence of heirs within the protected class. The
cases also indicate that whenever possible the courts will attempt to effectuate
charitable bequests.
ford v. Ott, 37 Cal. App. 47, 51, 173 Pao. 490, 491 (1918); 1 PAGE, op. cit. supra note
36, § 3.20, at121.
78 1 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 36, § 3.20, at 119.
79 E.g., Hart v. Hart, 194 Misc. 162, 81 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1948).
80 E.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 290 N.Y. 779, 50 N.E.2d 106 (1943).
s E.g., Ibey v. Ibey, 93 N.H. 434, 43 A.2d 157 (1949).82 Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 1, 8, 193 P.2d 721, 725 (1948).
83 1 Scorr, ThusTs, § 57.5, at 473-74 (2d ed. 1956).
84 President of Bowdom College v. Merritt, 75 Fed. 480 (N.D. Cal. 1896).
8 5 Estate of Sanderson, 58 Cal. 2d 522, '25 Cal. Rptr. 569, 375 P.2d 37 (1962);
Estate of Purcell, .167 Cal. 176, 179, 138 Pac. 704 (1914) (dictum).
86 Ibid.
87 Estate of Randall, 86 Cal. App. 2d 422, 194 P.2d 709 (1948); Estate of Davis,
74 Cal. App. 2d 357, 168 P.2d 789 (1946). It should be noted that it is unsafe to use
an individual as residuary legatee, as his death prior to that of the testator will cause
his gift to lapse- and fall into intestacy. It is perhaps best to use a Califorma non-profit
educational institution as residuary legatee, as this will guarantee that the charity will
get the whole gift. See CAL. PnoB. CODE § 42.
8 8 Estate of Haines, 76 Cal. App. 2d 673, 173 P.2d 693 (1946); Estate of Davis,
74 Cal. App. 2d 357, 168 P.2d 789 (1946).
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Efficacy of the Statute and Desirability of Reform
A discussion of the efficacy of the California mortmain statute must cover
three topics: the intent of the legislature in enacting the code provisions, whether
the courts have effectuated this intent in practice, and the resulting effect of the
statute. This discussion must necessarily precede any consideration of alternatives
to the present statute.
The legislative intent behind the California statute was to protect the heirs
of the testator, rather than to prevent charities from holding an excessive amount
of property.8 9 It was surmised that during the last period of the testator's life
he would become less conscious of those with whom he had natural ties of love
and affection, and more concerned with remembrance after death and eternal
salvation o In actual practice, however, the courts have not effectuated this in-
tent. In their determination of violations, they have favored the charities at the
expense of the heirs. One explanation of the attitude of the courts may be that,
even though strict construction of the statute could lead to the prevention of all
excessive gifts to charity during a certain period of the testators life, such pre-
clusion was beyond the contemplation of the legislature.91
The actual effect of the statute resulting from the court's interpretation is an
unfortunate one. It has been summenzed by Professor Richard R. B. Powell:
Some of these statutes have become substantially dead letters for all astute drafters
of wills. Thus in Califorma, the statute can be invoked only by designated rela-
tives who would otherwise have taken the property. Skilled draftsmen of wills
couple the excessive gift to charity with a gift over of any part thereof found to
be invalid to some person not one of the designated relatives, and the statute
becomes of no effect. Even in this state, however, the statute catches some wills,
and such a pitfall for the unskilled is of doubtful social value.92
One of the most telling arguments against the continuation of the statute in its
present form is the injustice which has resulted from the pattern of circumvention
allowed by the California courts. By the use of residuary or substitutional clauses,
devices known to all professional drafters of wills, the effect of the statute can
be completely avoided. However, the testator who writes out Is own holographic
will without the benefit of legal advice is penalized. His testamentary bequest
may well be futile if members of the protected class survive him.
An additional problem raised by the current statute is the amount of power
it gives to a fairly wide group of heirs. The scope of the protected class in the
statute is no longer realistic. It must be remembered that any voiding of bequests
that is done under the statute contravenes the intent of the testator. This nega-
tion of testamentary purpose is directly contrary to the approach in most will
cases. Therefore, it would seem reasonable that this group be strictly curtailed.
Although family ties have decreased as mobility has increased, the statute has
s9 Estate of Adams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 698, 33 P.2d 149 (1958); Estate of Davison,
96 Cal. App. 2d 263, 215 P.2d 504 (1950); accord, In re Webster's Estate, 178 Misc.
342, 33 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1942). The California statute and the New York statute construed
in the Webster case are very similar.
90 Estate of Lennon, 152 Cal. 327, 329, 92 Pac. 870, 871 (1907) (dictum); Estate
of Graham, 63 Cal. App; 41, 48, 218 Pac. 84, 87 (1923).
91President of Bowdom College v. Merritt, 75 Fed. 480 (N.D. Cal. 1896).
026 Powuri., RPAL ,oprzRr 502-04 (1965).
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not been modified to meet this trend. A much more realistic protected class would
be one limited solely to spouses and dependent children. The testator has an
obligation to support them in life, and it is logical that this responsibility should
not be escaped by death.
The effect of the Califorma statute remains the same as the effect of the
mortinai statute proposed in medieval England-the prevention of inheritance
by charities. Charity was singled out for this prohibition, rather than other
strangers, because it was feared that the non-profit nature of charitable organiza-
tions would induce gifts at the last of a testators life,93 while the possibility that
testators might will their property to non-charitable strangers was not deemed
worthy of legislative preclusion.9 4 However, it is unlikely that people place quite
the credence on being able to buy their way into heaven in the 1960's as they
might have a century ago. This lessening of credulity removes one of the major
reasons behind the statute.
Since it is apparent that the purpose of the statute has not been effectuated
in that the heirs have onlya uperficial protection, and that the statute noW serves
largely as a trap for the unwary, the question is directed to three alternatives:
Should the law be tightened to preclure evasions, should the restrictions on
charitable bequests be dispensed with altogether, or should the law be modified
to accomplish a more limited purpose.
Some authorities have shown a preference for the first alternative.9 5 It has
been stated by some writers that if the interest of the heirs is worth protecting,
the only way it can be done is by more or less reenacting the old English idea of
mortmain by declaring the excessive or untimely gifts void.96 A model statute
has been proposed which attempts to balance the interests of the heirs and the
charities' right to take under the will, and prevents the evasions common under
the California statute.97 Some opinion has been expressed to the effect that all
gifts to charity, whether testamentary or inter vivos, within a certain time period
of the testator's death should be voidable. 98 The problem with this approach is
that it continues the prohibition against charities, and does nothing to realistically
delineate the heirs who have an interest worth protecting in the testators estate.
On the other hand, elimination of the restrictions alogether might, in an occa-
sional case, leave dependents of the testator unprovided for. The relative infre-
quency of this occurrence should not preclude it from legislative, consideration
as severe hardship may otherwise result. The doctrines of undue influence, fraud
and lack of testamentary capacity may be inadequate to protect the family against
arbitrary disinheritance.
The most desirable alternative would be. the enactment of family maintenance
legislation.9 9 This type of legislation requires provision to be made for the support
3 Estate of Graham, 63 Cal. App. 41, 48, 218 Pac. 84, 87 (1923).
94 Decker v. American Umv., 236 Ia. 895, 20 N.W.2d 466 (1945).
95 AvxnsoN, LAw oF WILs 138 (2d ed. 1953); Joslin, Legal Restrctions on Gifts
to Charities, 21 TENN. L. REv. 761 (1951).
96 Avinsoiq, op. cit. supra note 95, at 138.
97 See Joslin, Legal Restritions on Gifts to Charities, 21 TENr. L. REv. 761, 769
(1951-) (which poses a list of suggestions for mortmain laws).
98 Id. at 765.
99 A discussion of family maintenance legislation is very ably presented in Lauffer,
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